information theory
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Shannon-Boltzmann-Darwin: Redefining Information Pt. 1
Posted by Terrence Deacon on 29 Oct 2008 | Tagged as: information theory
Abstract: A scientifically adequate theory of semiotic processes must ultimately be founded on a theory of information that can unify the physical, biological, cognitive, and computational uses of the concept. Unfortunately, no such unification exists, and more importantly, the causal status of informational content remains ambiguous as a result. Lacking this grounding, semiotic theories have tended to be predominantly phenomenological taxonomies rather than dynamical explanations of the representational processes of natural systems. This paper argues that the problem of information that prevents the development of a scientific semiotic theory is the necessity of analyzing it as a negative relationship: defined with respect to absence. This is cryptically implicit in concepts of design and function in biology, acknowledged in psychological and philosophical accounts of intentionality and content, and is explicitly formulated in the mathematical theory of communication (aka “information theory”). Beginning from the base established by Claude Shannon, which otherwise ignores issues of content, reference, and evaluation, this two part essay explores its relationship to two other higher-order theories that are also explicitly based on an analysis of absence: Boltzmann’s theory of thermodynamic entropy (in Part 1) and Darwin’s theory of natural selection (in Part 2). This comparison demonstrates that these theories are both formally homologous and hierarchically interdependent. Their synthesis into a general theory of entropy and information provides the necessary grounding for theories of function and semiosis.
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Shannon-Boltzmann-Darwin: Redefining Information Pt. 2
Posted by Terrence Deacon on 29 Oct 2008 | Tagged as: information theory
Abstract: A scientifically adequate theory of semiotic processes must ultimately be founded on a theory of information that can unify the physical, biological, cognitive, and computational uses of the concept. Unfortunately, no such unification exists, and more importantly, the causal status of informational content remains ambiguous as a result. Lacking this grounding, semiotic theories have tended to be predominantly phenomenological taxonomies rather than dynamical explanations of the representational processes of natural systems. This paper argues that the problem of information that prevents the development of a scientific semiotic theory is the necessity of analyzing it as a negative relationship: defined with respect to absence. This is cryptically implicit in concepts of design and function in biology, acknowledged in psychological and philosophical accounts of intentionality and content, and is explicitly formulated in the mathematical theory of communication (aka “information theory”). Beginning from the base established by Claude Shannon, which otherwise ignores issues of content, reference, and evaluation, this two part essay explores its relationship to two other higher-order theories that are also explicitly based on an analysis of absence: Boltzmann’s theory of thermodynamic entropy (in Part 1) and Darwin’s theory of natural selection (in Part 2). This comparison demonstrates that these theories are both formally homologous and hierarchically interdependent. Their synthesis into a general theory of entropy and information provides the necessary grounding for theories of function and semiosis.
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Memes as signs in the dynamic logic of semiosis: Molecular scienc meets computation theory
Posted by Terrence Deacon on 29 Oct 2008 | Tagged as: information theory
Abstract The concept of meme misidentifies units of cultural information as active agents, a shorthand similar to what misleads our understanding of genes and obscures the dynamic logic of evolution; but the concept does offer hope by contributing something missing from many semiotic theories. In treating memes as replicators, Dawkins fails to distinguish mere patterns from information (and replication from interpretation), which leads to the problem encountered in all realms of information processing: what counts as information is context dependent. Nothing is intrinsically meaningful, to be so it must be interpreted. In the evolution of both genes and words, replication has always been a multilevel affair in a dynamic system, from which what we conceive as “adapted” or “interpreted” units emerge. Memes are replicas not replicators, and I suggest that the iconic function of signs, as identified by Peirce, is the essence of the meme concept. As in sign function, both gene and meme functions are informed by whatever relationship exists between the physical pattern of the token and the system of processes in which each is embedded (so these are semiotic relationships). I argue that two, not-clearlyarticulated aspects of the meme concept could rescue semiotic from mere descriptive taxonomy and lead the way for a general theory of semiosis and a unifying methodology for the semiotic sciences to emerge.
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